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Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed
Qualified Immunity Statute for Arbitrators
by
MARK A. SPONSELLER*
I. Introduction
[The arbitration system] is founded, as is every system for the securing
of justice, upon faith and trust. History has nothing finer than the
constant and ever-recurring faith of men of every era and condition
that, by finding the facts and applying accepted rules of conduct,
whether crystallized in law or based on custom, justice will be done
.... For the man who deliberately and voluntarily submits his case to
another's decision and pledges himself to abide by it has active faith of
a high order in the method and in the integrity of the arbitrator.1
Commercial disputes are increasingly being submitted to arbitra-
tion2 for resolution. Parties to these disputes place their faith in the arbi-
trator and the arbitration process. The parties, however, are not likely to
consider the possibility of misconduct 3 by the arbitrator or the organiza-
tion that sponsors the arbitration. Nor are the parties likely to be aware
that arbitrators generally enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for
actions taken in connection with an arbitration.
This Note recommends statutory enactment of a qualified immunity
for arbitrators and their sponsoring organizations. In making this rec-
ommendation, the Note, in Part II, examines vacatur of arbitration
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1983, Rutgers College, Rutgers University; M.B.A.
1988, New York University.
1. MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 15-16 (1965) (quoting Florence E.
Allen, The Arbitration Movement in Historical Perspective, 8 ARB. J. 172, 173 (1953)).
2. Arbitration has been defined as:
A process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) ren-
ders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard.
Where arbitration is voluntary, the disputing parties select the arbitrator who has the
power to render a binding decision.
An arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of selected persons in
some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to established tribunals of justice, and is
intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and vexation of ordinary
litigation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (6th ed. 1990).
3. "Misconduct," as used in this Note, includes corruption, fraud, partiality, actions in
excess of authority, and reckless disregard of a party's rights.
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awards as a remedy for misconduct. Part III examines the history of and
justification for judicial immunity, which serves as the basis for arbitral
immunity. Building on this foundation, the evolution of arbitral immu-
nity is discussed, with special emphasis on California law. Justifications
for absolute arbitral immunity are refuted in Part IV by analyzing the
weaknesses in the analogy between arbitration and civil litigation. Policy
arguments for and against absolute immunity are then scrutinized. Fi-
nally, this Note proposes a qualified immunity statute.4
This Note limits its examination to commercial arbitration, and
does not address the arbitration, mediation and appraisal acts performed
by engineers, architects, accountants, appraisers, stock exchange arbitra-
tors, labor grievance committees and other similar groups. Because the
functions of these actors and the processes they follow differ from those
of commercial arbitration, it would be necessary to consider separately
the justifications for their immunity from civil liability before determin-
ing the extent to which they should be immune.
II. Vacating an Arbitration Award
The setting aside of an arbitration award is perhaps the most com-
mon remedy sought by parties subjected to arbitral misconduct.5 At
common law, an arbitration award could be set aside on only four
grounds: (1) corruption, (2) partiality, (3) excess of authority, and (4)
such palpable mistake of facts that, if it had not been made, the decision
of the arbitrators, according to their manifest intent, would have been
different.6 This common law rule has essentially been codified by the
Uniform Arbitration Act,7 adopted in nearly all of the states 8 and by the
Federal Arbitration Act.9
4. This topic is especially timely given that California's codification of arbitral immunity
is set to expire in 1996, at which time the legislature is to have "commission[ed] a study on
whether it is necessary to extend quasi-judicial immunity to [arbitrators]." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1280.1 note (Deering Supp: 1992).
5. See Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUs. REL. L.J.
228, 242 (1989).
6. Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853, 857 (W.D. S.C. 1957).
7. UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 140 (1985).
8. David L. Heinemann, Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 553-54 n.38 (citing G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5.04, at 62 (1983)).
9. An arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act will be vacated:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and mate-
rial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced.
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These grounds, however, preserve a very narrow avenue of relief;
when faced with an arbitration award, courts will not review the merits
of the controversy, the nature and sufficiency of the evidence, the nature
and credibility of the parties, nor alleged errors of law. 10
California has not adopted the exact language of the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act nor the language found in the Federal Arbitration Act; the
grounds for vacatur, however, are essentially the same. Section 1286.2 of
the California Civil Procedure Code sets out the grounds for vacatur. 11
The statute defines a narrow range of offenses that warrant judicial re-
view and that are sufficient for vacating an award. In essence, an award
will be vacated in only three circumstances: (1) If there is a showing of
"corruption, fraud or other undue means" on the part of the parties or
the arbitrator; (2) if an arbitrator's misconduct substantially prejudiced a
party's rights; or (3) if the arbitrators exceeded their powers as defined by
the arbitration agreement and the resulting award cannot be corrected.12
This principle of limited judicial review was applied in City of Oak-
land v. United Public Employees:13
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982), amended by 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (Supp. 111988); see also UNIF. ARB. ACT
§ 12, 7 U.L.A. 140 (1985) for similar provisions.
10. Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T. Ltd., 174 P.2d 441, 448 (Cal. 1946).
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982). The full text of the statute reads:
Subject to Section 1286.4 [procedural prerequisites], the court shall vacate the award
if the court determines that:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral
arbitrator;
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected with-
out affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbi-
trators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the
refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other
conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
Id. The statute provides the primary means for vacating an award. See Canadian Indem. Co.
v. Ohm, 76 Cal. Rptr. 902, 904 (Ct. App. 1969). In addition, the United States Supreme Court
has held that an actual showing of fraud, misconduct or partiality is not necessary to vacate an
arbitration award. Rather, the failure to disclose the possibility of partiality may be enough to
vacate an award. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968). California has adopted this holding in Figi v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 166 Cal. Rptr.
774 (Ct. App. 1980). But see Tipton v. Systron Donner Corp., 160 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Ct. App.
1979) (holding that there is no requirement that non-neutral arbitrators appointed by the par-
ties pursuant to an agreement must be neutral or impartial); Johnston v. Security Ins. Co., 86
Cal. Rptr. 133 (Ct. App. 1970) (vacating insurance arbitration award for failure of arbitrator
to disclose relationship with claimant's appraiser).
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982).
13. 224 Cal. Rptr. 523 (Ct. App. 1986).
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The merits of a controversy in arbitration are not open for judicial
review. The findings of an arbitrator on questions of law as well as
questions of fact are final and conclusive. It is not appropriate for
courts to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the arbitra-
tor's award or to pass upon the validity of the arbitrator's reasoning; a
court simply may not substitute its judgment for that of an arbitrator
.... [A]n award will not be set aside merely because the arbitrator
erred in finding the facts or applying the law. A court must enforce an
arbitrator's award even if it conflicts with substantive law, so long as it
is authorized by the arbitration agreement. Neither will errors in rea-
soning invalidate an otherwise proper award. Every intendment of va-
lidity must be given the award and doubts must be resolved in its
favor .... "A court must affirm an arbitrator's award if it 'can in any
rational way be derived from the agreement,' ... and can only reverse
if 'there is a manifest disregard of the agreement .... "1-14
Thus, arbitration awards must be affirmed even in the face of insufficient
evidence, obvious errors of law, obvious errors in reasoning, and findings
of fact contrary to the evidence. Due to this strong presumption in favor
of an award and the relatively limited grounds that a court will consider
in reviewing an award, arbitration awards are exceedingly difficult to
overturn.
One scholar has estimated that "[t]he number of arbitrator's awards
challenged in court is less than two hundred out of more than twenty-five
thousand (perhaps as many as forty thousand) awards issued each
year."1 5 If this estimate is accurate, less than one percent of all arbitra-
tion awards are challenged. This may be interpreted as evidence of the
futility of challenging an award.
Not only may it be futile to challenge an award, but the result of a
successful challenge-vacatur-does not compensate the aggrieved party
for her lost time, wasted attorney's fees, payments to arbitrators, and
other incidental and consequential damages. Vacatur is an important
means of nullifying the effect of an improper award; as a remedy for
arbitrator misconduct, however, it is at best incomplete.
III. Background on Judicial and Arbitral Immunity
A. Judicial Immunity
The judicial immunity doctrine, which is almost 400 years old, can
be traced back to two English cases, Floyd v. Barker16 and The Marshal-
14. Id. at 527-28 (citations omitted)(quoting Safeway Stores v. Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 147 Cal. Rptr. 835, 839 (Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Cross
Bros. Meat Packers, 518 F.2d 1113, 1121 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg. v.
Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969)))).
15. Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Selected Problems of Procedure and Evidence, in ARBITRATION
IN PRACTICE 49 (Arnold M. Zack ed., 1984).
16. 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607).
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sea.17 In Floyd v. Barker, a criminal defendant, who was convicted of
murder by a jury and sentenced to death by Judge Barker, brought suit
against the judge, the prosecutor, the jury and the grand jury for illegally
conspiring against him.18 Lord Coke announced that a
[f]udge... cannot be charged for conspiracy, for that which he did
openly in Court as Judge or justice of peace: and the law will not
admit any proof against this vehement and violent presumption of law,
that a justice sworn to do justice will do injustice; but if he hath con-
spired before out of Court, this is extrajudicial; ... and false and mali-
cious prosecutions, out of Court . . . amounts to an unlawful
conspiracy. 19
This constitutes one of two important limits on judicial immunity:20 The
so-called "judicial acts" limit on judicial immunity precludes immunity
when the judge's acts are administrative, legislative, or personal, rather
than judicial.21
In The Marshalsea, a judgment debtor sued the judge who had ruled
against him, claiming that the judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction
and thus was not immune from suit.22 Lord Coke agreed and held that
while a judge is not liable for his acts when there is jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the judge may be held liable for actions outside his juris-
diction. 23 This constitutes the second important limit on judicial immu-
nity:24 Actions taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction may subject
a judge to personal liability.25
The United States Supreme Court tested the limits of these two ex-
ceptions to judicial immunity in Stump v. Sparkman.26 In Stump, an
Indiana judge signed an order authorizing a tubal ligation on a fifteen-
year-old girl in an ex parte proceeding based on a petition by the girl's
mother.27 Despite the fact that no hearing was held, no notice was given
to the girl, no guardian ad litem was appointed to protect her interest,
and neither the petition nor the order was ever filed in the county circuit
court, the Court found that the judge had acted in his "judicial capac-
ity." 28 The Court examined past decisions and determined that a mere
"lack of formality" (i.e., a judge's failure to follow procedure) is not de-
17. 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1612).
18. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1306.
19. Id.
20. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 229-30; Michael R. King, Judicial Immunity
and Judicial Misconduct: A Proposal For Limited Liability, 20 Aiuz. L. REv. 549, 553 (1978).
21. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 230.
22. The Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1028-29.
23. Id at 1038.
24. King, supra note 20, at 553; see also Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 229-30.
25. King, supra note 20, at 553.
26. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
27. Id. at 351-352 & n.l.
28. Id. at 360-62.
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terminative of whether a judge's actions are "judicial. ' 29 Rather, the de-
terminative factors are whether the act constitutes a function "normally
performed by a judge," and whether the involved parties thought they
were "deal[ing] with the judge in his judicial capacity."' 30 The Court
found that both of these factors were satisfied in Judge Stump's case.31
First, state judges with general jurisdiction normally approve petitions
relating to the affairs of minors; and second, the girl's mother submitted
the petition to Judge Stump for the purpose of obtaining judicial
approval. 32
As to the jurisdictional requirement for judicial immunity, the
Court, despite the extreme and irreversible nature of the judge's order,
interpreted a general jurisdictional statute and found that the judge had
not acted beyond his jurisdiction. 33
Private remedies that compensate an injured party thus exist, if at
all, only when judicial immunity is not applicable; when the action in-
volved is not a judicial act or the judge has acted with a complete lack of
jurisdiction.34 There have been several cases in which private parties
have been allowed to sue judges in tort for malicious prosecution and
abuse of process when the judges acted with a complete lack of jurisdic-
tion.35 Judges have also been held liable for non-judicial acts that are
considered ministerial or administrative. 36 For example, when a judge
excluded African-Americans from juries, the United States Supreme
Court held that the duty of impartial jury selection was administrative
rather than judicial and no immunity attached. 37 The Supreme Court
has also determined that a judge's hiring and firing decisions with regard
to her staff are administrative and not deserving of absolute judicial
immunity.38
In addition to the narrowly defined private remedies allowed under
the exceptions to judicial immunity, judges may be subject to a variety of
29. Id. at 360-61.
30. Id. at 362.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 357-58 & n.8.
34. See King, supra note 20, at 571-76.
35. Id. at 576. Because of the "clear absence of jurisdiction" requirement for piercing
immunity, these cases have involved justices of the peace, not judges of general jurisdiction.
Id.
36. See id. at 576-77.
37. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879).
38. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988). The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988), has also been used to bring suits against judges. See, e.g., Briley v. California,
564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974). However,
for these suits to be successful, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that one of the exceptions to
judicial immunity is applicable. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227-30.
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"public remedies" for their misconduct. 39 One commentator argues that
the existing public remedies for judicial misconduct 4° are not effective
deterrents because they are infrequently used and do not compensate in-
jured litigants.41 Nevertheless, a judge may be subject to discipline for
violations of the code of judicial conduct in force in her jurisdiction.42
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct sets out standards for judicial
conduct.43 Under the Code, judges are required to "act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary" 44 and violation of the law is grounds for discipline. Spe-
cifically, judges are required to decide matters assigned to them4 and
perform their duties without bias or prejudice. 46 The purpose of the
Code is not to create the basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution.4 7
Violations of the Code may, however, be sufficient to result in involun-
tary retirement, removal, or censure.48
B. Arbitral Immunity
The 1880 Iowa case of Jones v. Brown49 is one of the earliest cases
addressing arbitral immunity.50 When the arbitrator sued to collect his
39. See King, supra note 20, at 563-69.
40. The public remedies include impeachment, address, recall and election, judicial disci-
plinary commissions, and disbarment. Id.
41. Id
42. In 1924 the American Bar Association (ABA) approved the Canons of Judicial Eth-
ics. In 1972 the ABA approved a new Model Code of Judicial Conduct and in 1990 consid-
ered a revised Model Code. In 1974 the U.S. Judicial Conference adopted the Code of
Conduct for Federal Judges. Nearly all states and the District of Columbia have promulgated
standards based more or less on these codes. The codes themselves do not provide an enforce-
ment mechanism. The first judicial conduct commission was created in California in 1960.
Now all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have permanent enti-
ties to receive and investigate complaints against judges. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Foreword to
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHics at vii (1990).
43. The preamble to the Code states that:
The text of the Canons and Sections is intended to govern conduct of judges and to
be binding upon them. It is not intended, however, that every transgression will
result in disciplinary action. Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the de-
gree of discipline to be imposed, should be determined through a reasonable and
reasoned application of the text and should depend on such factors as the seriousness
of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper activity and the effect of
the improper activity on others or on the judicial system.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (1990).
44. Id Canon 2A.
45. Id Canon 3B(l).
46. Id Canon 3B(5).
47. Id Pmbl.
48. See King, supra note 20, at 567-68 (discussing the proposed Judicial Tenure Act, S.
1423, Draft No. 2, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) and "typical" state commissions on judicial
discipline).
49. 6 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1880).
50. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 235 & n.40.
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fee, a party to the arbitration counterclaimed that the arbitrators had
conspired to defraud him by submitting an award before all of the evi-
dence was presented to them.51 The court dismissed the fraud action
ruling that the arbitrator was immune from liability for his judicial
acts.5
2
Common-law immunity for arbitrators is similar to judicial immu-
nity.53 Immunity generally applies to "arbitral acts" performed during
the course of an arbitration over which the arbitrator has some jurisdic-
tion.54 Arbitration associations, in turn, derive their immunity from the
arbitrator.5 5 Thus, when immunity attaches to the arbitrator, it attaches
to the association; conversely, when immunity does not attach to the ar-
bitrator, it does not protect the sponsoring organization.5 6
The 1983 California Court of Appeal decision in Baar v. Tigerman57
has generated considerable doubt as to the "absoluteness" of arbitral im-
munity in California. In Baar, the court refused to grant immunity to an
arbitrator who breached his contract to render a timely award.58 During
a period of about three-and-one-half years, the arbitrator, Tigerman, held
forty-three days of evidentiary hearings and ten days of closing argu-
ments.5 9 After final submission of the dispute to the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA), Tigerman failed to render an award within the
time allowed by statutory and AAA rules.60 In fact, more than seven
months after final submission he still had not rendered an award.61 The
parties to the arbitration then filed a civil action against Tigerman and
the AAA alleging, among other claims, breach of contract and negli-
gence.62 The trial court held that arbitral immunity protected the de-
fendants and sustained demurrers to all complaints. 63 The appellate
court reversed, 64 distinguishing earlier cases by observing that immunity
had previously been applied when there was alleged misconduct by the
arbitrator in arriving at a decision. 65 In contrast, Baar's complaint did
51. Jones v. Brown, 6 N.W. at 141.
52. Id. at 143.
53. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 237.
54. Id. at 238.
55. Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (Ct. App. 1983).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 835
59. Id. at 836.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 840.
65. Id. at 837.
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not allege misconduct in arriving at a decision, but rather focused on the
failure to make any award whatsoever.66
In reaching its decision the court distinguished an early case in
which judicial immunity was granted to a judge who failed to render an
award.67 The court analyzed the differences between judicial proceedings
and arbitrations: judges derive their power from the Constitution and
the people while arbitrators derive their power from private contracts;
judicial action has far-reaching and precedential consequences whereas
arbitrators do not create and are not bound by precedent; an independent
judiciary is essential to the preservation of democracy whereas arbitra-
tion plays a less noble role; trials are public whereas arbitration is pri-
vate; and judges must follow the law while arbitrators may disregard it.68
The court thus concluded that, in this case, the analogy to judicial pro-
ceedings was insufficient to warrant arbitral immunity.69 Rather than
blindly analogizing to judicial immunity, the court recognized the "fun-
damental" differences between the two types of proceedings, analyzed the
public policy reasons for arbitral immunity and reasoned that "arbitra-
tion remains essentially a private contractual arrangement between
parties." 70
Focusing on the contractual nature of arbitration, the court con-
cluded that breach of an arbitration contract may create a cause of ac-
tion.71 The court then cited with approval an Iowa decision that held
that an arbitrator's alleged corruption in the performance of his duties
constituted a cause of action for breach of the implied term of fair deal-
ing in the contract between the arbitrator and the parties, even though
the arbitrator was immune from a cause of action alleging corruption. 72
Thus, the party was availed of contract remedies, but not tort remedies.73
As to the issue of the AAA's liability, the court held that arbitral
immunity does not protect the sponsoring organization when the arbitra-
tor is not immune from liability or when the organization's actions are
administrative, rather than discretionary.74 Plaintiffs stated a cause of
action when they alleged that the AAA failed to exercise reasonable care
in the selection of the arbitrator and thereafter failed to properly admin-
ister the arbitration.75
66. Idr
67. _Ma t 838 (citing Wyatt v. Arnot, 94 P. 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1907)).
68. Id at 837-38.
69. " d at 837.
70. _M. at 838.
71. Id
72. Id at 838-39 (citing Bever v. Brown, 9 N.W. 911 (Iowa 1881)).
73. IM
74. Id at 839-40.
75. Id
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The extent of the Baar holding is not clear insofar as the court in
Baar supports two conflicting objectives without qualifying its support
for either. The conflict is best summarized by the court: "While we
must protect an arbitrator acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, we must
also uphold the contractual obligations of an arbitrator to the parties
involved. ' 76 As discussed below, these conflicting objectives are not
readily reconciled.
The court concluded that immunity is appropriate when a party al-
leges that an arbitrator is guilty of misconduct in arriving at a decision,
yet recognized a contract cause of action when an arbitrator is guilty of
corruption.77 In doing so, the court appeared to say that, unlike a judge,
an arbitrator has entered into a contractual relationship with the parties
to a dispute. Therefore, even though the arbitrator is immune from lia-
bility for quasi-judicial acts, she nonetheless has contractual duties that
may form the basis for a valid cause of action. This reasoning is logically
coherent. Nevertheless, virtually any claim of misconduct in arriving at
a decision can be stated as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Arbitral immunity could thus be effectively circum-
vented in most, if not all, cases by labeling the wrong as a contract
breach. This is contrary, however, to the court's recognition of the im-
portance arbitral immunity plays in protecting the arbitrator's "fearless
and independent decision making."'78 Arbitrators need to be protected
against vexatious suits brought without merit. Hence, this interpretation
of the Baar holding ignores the valid policy justifications for a limited
arbitral immunity. 79
An alternative interpretation of Baar limits the ruling to the facts of
the case. According to this interpretation, arbitrators may be held liable
for complete nonperformance of their contract with the parties. Any-
thing short of complete nonperformance would be protected by arbitral
immunity.80 This limited exception to arbitral immunity, however, pre-
vents other forms of contract breach from being recompensed and is
76. Id. at 838.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
78. Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
79. For a discussion of the justifications of limited arbitral immunity, see infra Part IV.
80. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 252-53. Nolan argues that Baar stands for the
proposition that nonperformance is an exception to arbitral immunity:
Nonfeasance is the only type of claim which justifies a departure from arbitral immu-
nity because it is the only situation in which the functional comparability test does
not work. Litigants have some remedies when a judge fails to act, such as the admin-
istrative authority of the chief judge of the court or a writ of mandamus from a
higher court. Parties to an arbitration lack these remedies and may have more need
for a tort or contract action against the nonperforming arbitrator.
Id. at 253.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
therefore inconsistent with the court's imperative to "uphold the contrac-
tual obligations of an arbitrator to the parties involved. 81
A compromise position is to hold an arbitrator liable when a party
can prove that the arbitrator's actions were the result of malice or a reck-
less disregard of the party's rights.8 2 A cause of action might be stated in
contract or tort when an arbitrator's decision is the result of such malice
or disregard. On the other hand, immunity would be appropriate for neg-
ligently derived decisions.
In 1985, two years after the decision in Baar, the California Legisla-
ture added section 1280.1 to the California Code of Civil Procedure.8 3
As enacted, the statute was to expire on January 1, 1991.84 In 1990, the
legislature amended the statute to extend the expiration date to January
1, 1996.85 The full text of the statute now reads:
An arbitrator has the immunity of a judicial officer from civil lia-
bility when acting in the capacity of arbitrator under any statute or
contract.
The immunity afforded by this section shall supplement, and not
supplant, any otherwise applicable common-law or statutory
immunity.
This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1996, and
as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which is en-
acted before January 1, 1996, deletes or extends that date.86
The second paragraph was added in 1990,87 apparently to eliminate any
confusion as to what effect the statute was to have on common-law
immunity.
This immunity statute was approved, conditioned on the Senate
Rules Committee's commission of a study on the need for arbitral immu-
nity; the study was to examine case law, statutory law, and public policy
arguments.88 The temporary nature of the statute and the requirement
81. Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 184-195.
83. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id
87. Id
88. 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 817, § 3. The complete text provides:
The Senate Rules Committee shall commission a study on whether it is necessary to
extend quasi-judicial immunity to neutral third persons who are engaged in media-
tion, arbitration, conciliation, evaluation, or similar dispute resolution efforts. The
study shall evaluate the pertinent case law and statutory provisions, including the
litigation privilege under subdivision (2) of section 47 of the Civil Code [privileged
communications in judicial proceedings] and the immunity for arbitrators provided
in Section 1280.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, the study shall examine
the competing policy arguments regarding exemptions from accountability for paid
and volunteer persons appointed by the court and those not appointed by the court.
The study shall be conducted under the auspices of a seven-member commission
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that a study be conducted reflect the legislature's concern that absolute
arbitral immunity may be too broad.
As stated by the statute,89 there was no intended diminution of com-
mon-law immunity. A literal reading of the statute, however, indicates
that there was also no supplemental effect. The common-law rule is that
arbitrators have the same protections from civil liability as do judicial
officers. 90 Therefore, the statute's provision that "[a]n arbitrator has the
immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting in the ca-
pacity of arbitrator under any statute or contract" 91 adds nothing to the
common law.
Arguably, the statute also has no effect on the Baar92 decision. The
arbitrator in Baar faced a suit for breach of contract,93 a situation nojudge has to face. Thus, affording "the immunity of a judicial officer" 94
would not bar the action. Nevertheless, the same court that authored the
Baar decision found in a 1989 decision, Coopers & Lybrand v. Superior
Court,95 that "[t]he purpose of the legislation was to supersede our hold-
ing in Baar.' ' 96 Therefore, despite the vague language, courts in Califor-
nia are likely to seize upon the word "contract" found in the statute and
hold that the Baar decision extends absolute immunity to an arbitrator
with respect to her obligations under an arbitration contract.
The statute, 97 however, does not mention arbitration associations.
Apparently, then, the holding in Baar is still valid with regard to these
organizations. Under Baar, there are two situations in which an arbitra-
tion association may be held liable: first, when the arbitrator is held lia-
ble under a contract breach theory, 98 and second, when the organization
appointed by the Senate Rules Committee, except as specified, to be composed, as
follows:
(a) A professor of law from a University of California law school. (b) A representa-
tive of a voluntary bar association. (c) A representative of the California Trial Law-
yers Association. (d) A representative of the State Bar of California. (e) A lawyer
selected by the Chair of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary. (f) A lawyer selected
by the Chair of the Senate Committee on Judiciary. (g) A nonlawyer representative
of the public engaged in dispute resolution selected by the Chair of the Senate Com-
mittee on Judiciary.
The study and report shall be completed and transmitted to the Legislature on or
before January 1, 1993 id.
89. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
90. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
91. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
92. Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Ct. App. 1983).
93. Id. at 836.
94. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
95. 260 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Ct. App. 1989).
96. Id. at 720. See infra text accompanying notes 103-118 for a discussion of the case and
its holding.
97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
98. Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (Ct. App. 1983)
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has mishandled its administrative actions.99 Nevertheless, if California's
immunity statute for arbitrators grants immunity from contract breach
claims (as suggested by the court in Coopers & Lybrand),100 then a court
faced with the question of liability of an arbitration association on a con-
tract breach theory might extend immunity to the association based on
the notion that the association derives its immunity from the arbitra-
tor.101 This protection, however, should not extend to administrative
acts because the statute only covers acts performed "in the capacity of
arbitrator." 10 2
Coopers & Lybrand is the only published case interpreting immunity
under section 1280.1.103 Coopers & Lybrand, an accounting firm, was
retained by two parties, the Federated Group, Inc. and Atari Corpora-
tion. °4 Atari was in the process of purchasing Federated for approxi-
mately $35,000,000.105 Coopers was retained to audit Federated's
balance sheet to determine whether adjustments affecting the value of the
transaction were required.10 6 The owner of the controlling interest in
Federated alleged that Coopers, expecting to receive future business from
Atari, overstated balance sheet adjustments to Atari's benefit.107
Coopers demurred on the ground that they were acting as arbitrators and
were protected by arbitral immunity.108 The appellate court held that a
factual question remained as to whether the parties' agreement was for
arbitration 0 9 but proceeded nonetheless to discuss the state of arbitral
immunity. 110
The Coopers court, the same court that had decided Baar, acknowl-
edged that in Baar1 it had held that the arbitrator's contractual obliga-
tions to the parties involved must be given credence.1 12 It stated,
however, that the purpose of section 1280.1113 was to supersede the Baar
holding and "to expand arbitral immunity to conform to judicial immu-
nity when the arbitrator is acting under any statute or contract."' 1 4 The
court took notice of various legislative materials in its quest for the stat-
99. Id. at 839-40.
100. 260 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
101. See 189 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
102. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
104. 260 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 721.
110. Id. at 719-21.
111. Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Ct. App. 1983).
112. 260 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
113. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
114. 260 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (citing Senate Bill No. 1001).
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ute's legislative intent." 15 According to the court, the legislature deter-
mined that due to overwhelming court congestion, the policy of
encouraging persons to serve as arbitrators justified complete immu-
nity. 116 The court also observed that the legislature demonstrated its
"concern about the impact of such sweeping arbitral powers" by making
the statute an "experimental" one and providing an expiration date." 7
In summary, until the legislature acts to change the immunity statute 81 8
or the California Supreme Court interprets the statute differently, arbi-
trators in California are not likely to be held liable for any breaches of
duties owed under contracts to perform arbitration services.
In addition to California, a few other states have codified common-
law absolute immunity for arbitrators." 9 As an example, the Florida
statute provides that arbitrators and mediators "shall have judicial im-
munity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge."' 20 In
North Carolina, "[a]rbitrators . . . have the same immunity as judges
from civil liability for their official conduct."' 2' Arbitrators in Wisconsin
"are immune from civil liability for any act or omission within the scope
of their performance of their powers and duties."' 122
Jurisdictions without immunity statutes (including federal courts)
rely on common-law immunity. 23 The typical statutes enumerated
115. Id. at 720 n.7.
116. Id. at 720.
117. Id. at 720-21.
118. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
119. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 44.107 (1990) (providing immunity to same extent as judge
when arbitrator appointed by court or selected by parties); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37.1(e)
(1989) (providing judicial immunity to arbitrators participating in court-ordered non-binding
arbitration); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-26 (1987) (providing absolute immunity for
health services arbitrator); WIs. STAT. § 93.50(2)(c) (1989-1990) (immunizing arbitrators for
acts or omissions within scope of duty under law providing for arbitration of disputes between
farmers and creditors).
120. FLA. STAT. § 44.107 (1990).
121. N.C. GEN. STAT § 7A-37.1. (1990).
122. Wis. STAT. § 93.50(2)(c) (1989-90).
123. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 261. There is some variation among the juris-
dictions as to the judicial nature of independent appraisers, accountants, engineers, architects,
labor grievance committees, etc., and thus the extent of quasi-judicial immunity that they en-
joy. See Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984) (New Jersey Supreme Court refused
to extend arbitral immunity to an accounting firm appointed by the trial court to value a
business interest for the purposes of a divorce settlement); see also Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst,
72 N.W.2d 364 (Minn. 1955) (reaching the same result in Minnesota). But see Penn Cent.
Corp. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 441 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div. 1981) (determination of im-
munity held to depend not on what label is used to describe defendants but whether parties
agreed to resolution of their dispute by third person). In Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr.
893 (Ct. App. 1990), quasi-judicial immunity was granted to a psychologist who was hired by
both parents to a child custody dispute. The court extended absolute quasi-judicial immunity
to "neutral third-parties for their conduct in performing dispute resolution services which are
connected to the judicial process and involve either (1) the making of binding decisions, (2) the
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above add nothing to common-law immunity. Thus, in all jurisdictions
arbitrators are protected by the common-law immunity or a statutory
enactment of this immunity. 124
IV. Justifications for Arbitral Immunity
One way to judge the validity of absolute arbitral immunity is to
examine the justifications for it. The United States Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the justifications for quasi-judicial immunity in Butz v. Econo-
mou. 125 The case concerned the immunity of United States Department
of Agriculture administrative law judges from damage claims arising out
of asserted violations of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 126 The Court
conferred absolute immunity on these administrative law judges insulat-
ing them from charges of malice in confirming an administrative com-
plaint.1 27 The Court reasoned that a grant of absolute immunity is
justified by the importance of protecting the administrative law judges
making of findings or recommendations to the court or (3) the arbitration, mediation, concilia-
tion, evaluation or other similar resolution of pending disputes." Id. at 903. These differences
illustrate the need for a separate analysis of quasi-judicial immunity for non-arbitrators. Such
an analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
124. In California, according to the Coopers & Lybrand court, not only does the immunity
statute confer common-law immunity, but it protects arbitrators from contract breach claims
of the type asserted in Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 838-39 (Ct. App. 1983). Coopers
& Lybrand v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 713, 720-21 (Ct. App. 1989).
Maryland has limited "absolute" common-law immunity in the narrow context of health
care malpractice arbitration by enacting a qualified immunity statute. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 5-352 (1990). For the text of the statute, see infra text accompanying note 179.
125. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
126. Id. at 480.
127. Id. at 514. The court reasoned:
Absolute immunity is ... necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses
can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.
At the same time, the safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce
the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional con-
duct. The insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of prece-
dent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the
correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many checks on malicious
action by judges ....
We think that adjudication within a federal administrative agency shares
enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in
such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages.... [F]ederal ad-
ministrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the same safe-
guards as are available in the judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in
nature .... They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political influ-
ence .... A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence,
and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitutes
the exclusive record for decision .... The parties are entitled to know the findings
and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the
record."
Id. at 512-13 (citations omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C §§ 555-557 (1976)).
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against intimidation, as well as the presence of procedural safeguards
that effectively control possible misconduct.128 When those safeguards
are lacking, absolute immunity is less appropriate, and the threat of pri-
vate damage claims against the quasi-judicial officer may be necessary to
effectively control possible misconduct.129
In the arbitration context, most of the safeguards listed by the
Supreme Court 130 are lacking. In contrast to a judge, an arbitrator need
not follow precedent, rules of evidence, nor the rules of law.131 An arbi-
trator, who is likely to be a business person or attorney, does not enjoy
political insularity to the same degree as a judge.132 Unlike judicial find-
ings in civil litigation, in which "parties are entitled to know the findings
and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law or discretion"' 133 an arbi-
tration award is nothing more than a statement of the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties. 134 In fact, arbitration associations discourage
arbitrators from giving reasons for a decision "because they identify
targets for the losing party to attack."' 135 A record of the proceedings,
fundamental to civil litigation, is not required in an arbitration. 36 In
most cases a transcript of the arbitration proceedings will not be pre-
pared. 137 Because appellate review of an arbitration proceeding is signifi-
cantly limited, 138 the usefulness of a transcript as a procedural safeguard
is similarly limited.139 Thus, the safeguards relied upon by the Supreme
128. Id. at 512.
129. Cf Id. (judicial safeguards reduce need for private damage actions).
130. Id. at 512-13.
131. See Lauria v. Soriano, 4 Cal. Rptr. 328, 333 (Ct. App. 1960) ("[A]rbitrators are not
bound by strict adherence to legal procedure and to the rules on the admission of evidence
.... '1).
132. Admittedly, this point is not as persuasive when an arbitrator is compared to an
elected judge or a judge subject to recall. Even these judges are, however, likely to be more
insulated from the influences of the business community in relation to any particular case than
an arbitrator who is directly selected by the parties. In fact, Professor Nolan, an advocate of
absolute arbitral immunity, acknowledges that "selection by the parties makes the arbitrator
subject to the very 'political influence' that worried the Supreme Court." Nolan & Abrams,
supra note 5, at 234.
133. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
134. JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 1274 (5th ed. 1989).
135. ROBERT COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 29 (3d
ed. 1986).
136. See id. at 26 ("Transcripts and briefs can be eliminated if the parties and their attor-
neys are willing to do so. In general, the AAA encourages parties to streamline their proce-
dures. Purchasing an official transcript can be particularly expensive. In arbitration,
transcripts are often a waste of money. In most cases, the arbitrator and the attorneys rely
upon their own notes.").
137. Id.
138. See supra Part II for discussion of judicial review of arbitration awards for the pur-
pose of vacatur.
139. MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 84-85 (1965) ("[P]arties in commer-
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Court in recognizing judicial immunity are not found in the arbitration
context.
Professor Nolan, in his article on arbitral immunity, argues that de-
spite these differences, there are ample safeguards within the arbitration
process to justify immunity.140 According to Professor Nolan, the volun-
tary nature of the process supports a presumption that those who use it
know of the risks. 141 Put more bluntly, Professor Nolan seems to say
that by voluntarily submitting a dispute to arbitration, the parties assume
the risk of a breakdown in the process and accept the lack of a remedy
for the resulting harms. Parties choosing arbitration, however, probably
do not consciously assume the risk of non-redressable arbitrator miscon-
duct or bias. This is especially true given that many parties agree to an
arbitration clause as part of an overall commercial contract at a time
when a dispute is not anticipated.142
Arbitrators are often participants in the industry for which they per-
form arbitration services. 143 This creates a familiarity with industry
practices and ethical codes. 44 Professor Nolan asserts that this familiar-
ity with industry practices and ethical codes serves as a form of prece-
dent. 145 Familiarity with the industry, however, is not binding and is
therefore no substitute for rules of precedent and the threat of appellate
review."14 Since the safeguards described by the Supreme Court are ab-
sent, absolute arbitral immunity is not appropriate, and the threat of pri-
vate damage claims against the arbitrator becomes necessary to
discourage possible misconduct.
In addition to procedural safeguards, the Supreme Court justified
absolute immunity on the basis that it is "necessary to assure that judges,
advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without
harassment or intimidation."'' 47 Clearly, the public policy favoring arbi-
tration 48 would be frustrated by a qualified immunity doctrine that facil-
itates vexatious suits by unhappy parties who have no substantial
evidence of misconduct or bias and are in reality merely making collat-
eral attacks on the arbitration award. Malicious or corrupt arbitrators
cial arbitration generally do not require records to be taken at the hearing. Moreover, records
appear unnecessary when courts will not review the merits of the case.").
140. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 234.
141. Id
142. See COUND, supra note 134, at 1238.
143. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 234.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 165-175 for a discussion of the Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes and the fact that only informal remedies exist for viola-
tions of this Code.
147. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
148. See Elvi J. Olesen, Note, Baar v. Tigerman: An Attack on Absolute Immunity for
Arbitratorsl, 21 CAL. W. L. REv. 564, 569 n.39 (1985).
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should, however, be liable for damages that their misconduct has caused.
Thus, the legislature should devise an immunity doctrine that strikes a
balance between the interest of litigants in being protected from arbitra-
tor misconduct and the interest of arbitrators in being protected from
groundless suits.
Another frequently cited justification for arbitral immunity relies on
a difference between arbitrators and judges. Courts have held that since
most arbitrators serve on a voluntary basis, the threat of lawsuits against
them would outweigh their non-monetary motivations for performing ar-
bitration services and thus the availability of this form of alternative dis-
pute resolution would suffer. 149 This argument's premise is defective.
While it is true that commercial arbitrators historically have been volun-
teers serving infrequently and without compensation, 150 the number of
cases in which arbitrators are paid and the amount of compensation they
receive has increased along with the number of disputes submitted to
arbitration.151 Rather than assuming that arbitrators serve on a volun-
tary basis, courts have held that parties must "fairly and reasonably com-
pensate an arbitrator for services rendered."' 152
Arbitration is rapidly becoming a "profession." Universities, recog-
nizing this trend, have established degrees in alternative dispute resolu-
tion. 153 Graduates with this degree are seeking positions as professional
arbitrators and mediators. 154 There has been a proliferation of "for
profit" arbitration firms established by former builders, retired judges
and attorneys. 155  Furthermore, as attorneys have served more fre-
quently, law firms have begun requiring their members to bill at the nor-
mal hourly rate. 156
As arbitration becomes more of a profession than a part-time volun-
tary service to an individual's trade or profession, arguments advocating
professional accountability become stronger. Few would contend that
potential lawyers, doctors, or accountants are deterred from entering
their chosen profession because of the possibility that they may be held
149. Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 141 (1990). "[I]ndividuals ... cannot be expected to volunteer to
arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in the struggle between the litigants and saddled
with the burdens of defending a lawsuit." Id. (quoting Corey v. New York Stock Exchange,
691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982)); see also Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 235 & n.39
and cases cited therein.
150. Garylee Cox, Selection and Appointment, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE
1990s 27, 37 (Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 38 (quoting Cecil v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 298 P.2d 24, 25
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156, Id. at 39.
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liable for their misconduct. Therefore, the argument that potential liabil-
ity for misconduct will hamper the availability of arbitration is becoming
increasingly invalid. While imposing potential liability may speed this
professionalization by increasing the need for malpractice insurance, in-
creased professionalism and accountability is not an undesirable
outcome.
Justifications for absolute immunity for arbitration associations rest
on the premise that organizational immunity derives from that of the
arbitrator:
Extension of arbitral immunity to encompass boards which sponsor
arbitration is a natural and necessary product of the policies underly-
ing arbitral immunity; otherwise the immunity extended to arbitrators
is illusionary. It would be of little value to the whole arbitral proce-
dure to merely shift the liability to the sponsoring association.15 7
Thus, an arbitration association should not be held liable for the acts of
an arbitrator when the arbitrator herself is immune from liability. How-
ever, the "judicial acts" limitation on immunity15 8 should serve as an
independent source of organizational liability apart from any actions of
the arbitrator. Furthermore, certain functions of an arbitration associa-
tion concern the administration of the arbitration proceeding. If the
sponsoring organization negligently or corruptly fails to follow its own
rules on arbitrator selection or supervision of the proceeding, it should be
held accountable for the damages caused by these improper administra-
tive acts under the current "administrative acts" exception to absolute
immunity, regardless of whether the individual arbitrator has mis-
performed an administrative act.
Public policy justifies holding arbitration associations liable for a
breakdown in the arbitration process. As the purveyor of these services,
they are better able to insure against the risk of damages than are individ-
ual parties to an arbitration. The incremental insurance costs could be
passed on to the parties to the arbitration, and damages resulting from
instances of arbitrator or association misconduct could be compensated
by this insurance. This approach to liability and damage compensation is
consistent with the development of strict products liability in Califor-
157. Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Corey v. New
York Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982)).
158. A judge's administrative acts are not "judicial" and are thus not protected by com-
mon-law judicial immunity. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21. Because arbitral and
judicial immunity are coextensive, Coopers & Lybrand, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 721, administrative
acts of an arbitrator are similarly unprotected. To the extent that the Coopers & Lybrand
decision extends immunity beyond the common-law rule (based on the court's interpretation of
California Code of Civil Procedure 1280.1), it merely protects arbitrators from contract breach
actions of the type asserted in Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39. For a discussion of
the Coopers & Lybrand decision, see supra text accompanying notes 103-118. The decision
does not, however, purport to abridge the "judicial acts" requirement for application of immu-
nity. See Coopers & Lybrand, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
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nia. 159 The public policy arguments supporting strict products liability
are equally appropriate in the context of arbitration services. The pri-
mary purpose of strict products liability "is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the producers that
put injurious products on the market, rather than by the innocent injured
consumers who are powerless to protect themselves." 160 "[T]he risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business." 161 In the same manner, the costs of
damages resulting from a malicious or corrupt arbitrator should be borne
by the arbitrators and arbitration associations that put the damaging
services on the market, rather than by innocent parties. The arbitration
association can insure against this risk of damages and distribute the cost
among its clientele.
V. Private and Public Remedies for Arbitral Misconduct
Parties to arbitration that have been subjected to arbitrator miscon-
duct have advanced a number of theories to support a civil cause of ac-
tion in an attempt to collect damages and obtain other relief.162 Beyond
breach of contract claims based on a complete failure of performance,1 63
however, the various theories asserted by plaintiff's lawyers to hold arbi-
trators personally liable for misconduct have consistently been rebuffed
by arbitral immunity.164 Overall, therefore, the current form of absolute
arbitral immunity successfully defeats most private actions against
arbitrators.
159. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
160. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
161. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
162. See Nolan & Abrams supra note 5, at 240-51.
163. See e.g., Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 508 v. Standard Register Co., 103 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2212 (S.D. Ohio 1979) recons. 103 L.R.R.M. 2214; E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan
Constr. Co., 387 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Ala. 1974), remanded on other grounds, 551 F.2d 1026,
(5th Cir. 1977), reh'g granted in part, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067
(1978); Baar v. Tigerman, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Ct. App. 1983). Note, however, that the combi-
nation of the enactment of CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992) and the
decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Ct. App. 1989), had
effectively overruled the Baar decision. See supra notes 83-118 and accompanying text.
164. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at 240-51, 260. The authors discuss the theories
in detail and conclude that:
[t]he only limitations on immunity are these:
(1) Arbitrators, like all other citizens, are liable for any crimes they commit;
(2) Arbitrators are liable for negligence or breach of contract if they totally fail
to perform their obligations;
(3) Arbitrators who violate a person's constitutional or civil rights, an unlikely
event, might be subject to injunctive or declaratory relief ....
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The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes may
provide some minimal "public" remedy for arbitral misconduct and a
correspondingly minimal deterrent effect on this misconduct. The Code
was written by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) as a guide
to arbitrators in fulfilling their duties under an arbitration contract. 165 It
sets forth a number of the arbitrator's responsibilities. 166 Among these,
"[a]n arbitrator should uphold the integrity and fairness of the arbitra-
tion process." 167 An arbitrator is required to disclose current or past
relationships with parties and pecuniary interests in the subject matter,1 68
as well as to avoid delay and render a timely award.1 69 Furthermore, an
arbitrator "should conduct the proceedings in an evenhanded manner
and treat all parties with equality and fairness at all stages of the pro-
ceedings."170 The Code does not provide for a disciplinary mechanism
or establish any additional grounds for judicial review of arbitration
awards.171
The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators is analogous to the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct 72 in that both admonish unfair actions and
failures to disclose potential conflicts of interest. As a guide to arbitrator
conduct without any meaningful enforcement mechanism,173 however,
the Code's analogy to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is weak-
ened. Whereas violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct can result in a
judge's removal from the bench,' 74 violations of the Code of Ethics for
Arbitrators go unpunished or merely result in less frequent listing of the
offending arbitrator in the association's reference list of qualified arbitra-
tors. 7 5 The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
therefore provides only a weak deterrent against arbitral misconduct.
Statutes that establish criminal sanctions for a limited form of arbi-
tral misconduct, namely bribery, are common. 176 In California, arbitra-
165. Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Pmbl. (1977), in ROBERT
COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 141-42 (1986). The Code
was cosponsored by the ABA. Id at 142. The Code does not supersede agreements between
the parties or applicable law with respect to arbitrator conduct. Id. Use of the Code as a guide
is not intended to be limited to arbitrations administered by the AAA or cases in which arbi-
trators are lawyers. Id. at 141. Rather, the Code "is presented as a public service to provide
guidance in all types of commercial arbitration." Id.
166. Id passim.
167. Id Canon I at 142.
168. Id Canon II at 143-44.
169. Id Canon IV at 145.
170. Id.
171. Id Pmbl. at 141.
172. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
173. See Steven J. Goering, Note, The Standard of Impartiality as Applied to Arbitrators by
the Federal Courts and Codes ofEthics, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 821, 830-31 (1990).
174. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
175. Goering, supra note 173, at 830.
176. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.660 (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-704 (1991); FLA.
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tors that ask for, receive or agree to receive bribes to influence their
decisions are guilty of a crime and can be jailed for up to four years. 177
This statute's deterrent effect on arbitrator misconduct, however, is ques-
tionable. Owing to its apparent lack of enforcement1 78 and narrow focus,
this penal statute is not a sufficient substitute for the threat of private
damage claims as a deterrent to misconduct.
VI. Proposed Qualified Immunity for Arbitrators
Currently, Maryland is the only jurisdiction to have enacted a quali-
fied immunity statute for arbitrators:
In the absence of an affirmative showing of malice or bad faith, each
arbitrator in a health care malpractice claim under Title 3, Subtitle 2A
of this article from the time of acceptance of appointment has immu-
nity from suit for any act or decision made during tenure and within
the scope of designated authority. 179
This statute enables a Maryland plaintiff, in the limited context of health
care malpractice arbitration, to make an affirmative showing of malice or
bad faith and thereby defeat an arbitrator's immunity. 180 Every other
jurisdiction and the federal courts rely on common-law immunity, either
by judicial decision or by legislative enactment.1 8 1 The following propo-
sal would change this state of affairs. The proposed statute is aimed spe-
cifically at California, since California's immunity statute for arbitrators
will expire in 1996.182 The arguments and logic that support this propo-
sal, however, make it equally appropriate for inclusion in the Uniform
Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act.
STAT. ch. 838.15 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-1302 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4405 (1990);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 268, § 14 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.120 (1991); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-9-5 (1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.02 (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 384 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-7-2 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-270 (Law. Co-op.
1990); W. VA. CODE § 61-5-7 (1992); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 402 (1991).
177. CAL. PENAL CODE § 93 (West 1988). The full text of the statute follows:
Every judicial officer, juror, referee, arbitrator, or umpire, and every person au-
thorized by law to hear or determine any question or controversy, who asks, receives,
or agrees to receive, any bribe, upon any agreement or understanding that his vote,
opinion, or decision upon any matters or question which is or may be brought before
him for decision, shall be influenced thereby, is punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison for two, three or four years.
Id. (emphasis added).
178. This author could not find any reported cases involving California Penal Code § 93
and arbitrators.
179. MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-352 (1990).
180. Id. There are no reported cases interpreting this statute.
181. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
182. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1991).
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A. Objectives of a Qualified Immunity Statute
The recognized exceptions to arbitral immunity, including actions
taken wholly without jurisdiction (i.e., outside the context of an arbitra-
tion proceeding) and misconduct of an administrative nature, should re-
main unprotected.18 3 Misconduct that occurs during the performance of
an "arbitral act" over which the arbitrator has jurisdiction, however,
should be evaluated against a qualified immunity standard. The appro-
priate standard would be derived from the common-law requirement that
a plaintiff prove subjective bad faith or malice. 184
A recent United States Supreme Court case, Wyatt v. Cole,185 dis-
cusses the evolution of the common-law immunity into the qualified im-
munity that most government officials now enjoy. The Court has
determined that "government officials performing discretionary func-
tions are shielded from 'liability for civil damages insofar as their con-
duct [does] ... not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' "186 This
"wholly objective" standard "'completely reformulated qualified immu-
nity along principles not at all embodied in the common law.' "187 The
reasons for abrogating the common-law inquiry into the actor's subjec-
tive state of mind was to "'avoid excessive disruption of government and
permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judg-
ment.' "188 The Court determined that these rationales were not applica-
ble to private defendants and therefore refused to extend this form of
immunity beyond government officials. 18 9
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the objective
standard qualified immunity was developed at a time when summary
183. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
184. See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1835 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
185. 112 S.Ct. 1827 (1992).
186. It at 1832 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
187. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987)).
188. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 456 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
189. Id. at 1834. In Wyatt, the defendants, a private individual (Bill Cole) and his attor-
ney, were alleged to have "conspire[d] with state officials to violate constitutional rights" when
they invoked an unconstitutional state replevin statute causing a court to order the sheriff to
seize 24 head of cattle, a tractor, and other property from Mr. Cole's former business partner.
Id. at 1829, 1834. The business partner sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, for deprivation, under color of state law, of his constitutional right to due process. Id.
at 1829-30. The Court looked to the most closely analogous common-law torts of 1871 (mali-
cious prosecution and abuse of process) to determine whether defendants would have been
afforded an immunity under the common law. Id. at 1831. The Court determined that no
such immunity existed in 1871, the year the Civil Rights Act was passed. Id. at 1831-32.
Therefore, defendants were not entitled to any immunity. Id. Furthermore, the Court held
that the rationales for the Harlow objective standard for qualified immunity of government
officials (to "'avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many
insubstantial claims on summary judgment' ") were not applicable to private defendants. Id.
at 1832-33. Therefore, the defendants were not entitled to Harlow immunity. Id. at 1833.
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judgment standards regarding a factual question such as subjective intent
made it difficult for a defendant to prevail. 190 Justice Kennedy noted
that summary judgment may now be entered against a party " 'who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element es-
sential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial.' "191 Justice Kennedy also noted that at common law, in
both malicious prosecution and abuse of process actions, it was essential
for the plaintiff to prove that the wrongdoer acted with malice (a subjec-
tive element) and without probable cause (an objective element). 192
Therefore, assuming that an element of plaintiffs claim is that the de-
fendant acted with malice, the claim "may be resolved on summary judg-
ment if the plaintiff cannot come forward with facts from which bad faith
can be inferred." 193 This ability to dispose of an action at the summary
judgment stage, even when the inquiry involves the subjective state of
mind of the defendant, greatly reduces the need for an objective standard
qualified immunity.
Based on these common-law origins and the Court's refusal to ex-
tend an objective standard qualified immunity to private individuals, the
following structure is proposed for suits against arbitrators. The plaintiff
would be required to prove that the arbitrator's alleged misconduct was
performed with subjective bad faith or malice. 194 The difficulty of prov-
ing subjective bad faith is more apparent than real. Because the existence
of subjective bad faith is a question of fact, it may be established by infer-
ence from the evidence of objective bad faith. That is, if a plaintiff estab-
lishes that the arbitrator's actions were performed without any
objectively reasonable grounds for belief in the propriety of the conduct
in light of all circumstances existing at the time of the conduct, an infer-
ence of subjective bad faith is established. Of course, the arbitrator may
rebut this inference with sufficient proof of subjective good faith. 195 To
survive summary judgment, therefore, the plaintiff would have to present
either (1) evidence of subjective bad faith; or (2) evidence of objective bad
faith that is sufficient to support an inference of subjective bad faith.
190. Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
191. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986)).
192. Id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194. Contrary to Justice Kennedy's assertion that at common law, both malice and lack of
probable cause had to be proven by the plaintiff, id. at 1835, 1838 n.1, his application of this
principle indicates that the determinative issue is the defendant's subjective state of mind. See
id. at 1837 ("[I]t ought to be open to [the plaintiff] at least in theory to argue that the defend-
ant's [subjective] bad faith eliminates any [objectively reasonable] reliance on the statute, just
as it ought to be open to the defendant to show [subjective] good faith even if some construct of
a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have acted in a different way.").
195. See id. at 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Affidavits, depositions and testimony of arbitrators should be al-
lowed over the objection of the arbitrators to prove misconduct. The
standard for compelling this testimony should be the same as the current
standard for proving misconduct in an action to vacate an award. 196
Thus, this type of evidence would be allowed when it is offered by a
dissenting arbitrator, 197 or when some objective basis exists for a reason-
able belief that misconduct has occurred. 198
Mandatory sanctions would be useful in deterring unfounded suits,
which is an important objective of the revised qualified immunity statute.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be used as the
model. Rule 11 requires an attorney to certify that she believes, after
reasonable inquiry, that the pleading is "well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law" and is not filed for any im-
proper purpose.1 99 If a complaint (or "other paper") is signed in viola-
tion of the rule, the court "shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include
... a reasonable attorney's fee." 2 ° A similar provision should be added
to the California Civil Procedure Code for suits brought against
arbitrators.
One possible means of preventing the cost of arbitrator malpractice
insurance from significantly affecting the overall desirability and availa-
bility of arbitration would be to limit the liability of an arbitrator and the
arbitration association. As an example of this type of legislation, Califor-
nia limits compensation for noneconomic losses resulting from medical
malpractice to $250,O0.21 The purpose of this statute was to reduce
medical malpractice insurance premiums. 20 2 In the area of arbitration
196. Generally, arbitrators have a testimonial privilege that enables them to refuse to tes-
tify to the circumstances of awards that they render. See Nolan & Abrams, supra note 5, at
254-55. An exception to this privilege exists when a party seeks to prove arbitrator miscon-
duct for the purpose of vacating an award. See, eg., Kauffman v. Haas, 318 N.W.2d 572, 574
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 230 S.E.2d 380,
387 (N.C. 1976). The North Carolina Supreme Court has provided a test that balances the
arbitrator's interest in being free from harassment with the needs of litigants to obtain evidence
of misconduct: "An arbitrator's deposition of misconduct may be allowed in evidence only
when some objective basis exists for a reasonable belief that misconduct has occurred." Caro-
lina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 230 S.E.2d at 387 (emphasis added). The
type of misconduct that the court intended to reach with this test was "misconduct which can
likely be corroborated or denied, either by other members of the arbitration panel or by extrin-
sic evidence." Id. at 387.
197. Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 230 S.E.2d at 385.
198. See id at 387.
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
200. Id
201. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1992).
202. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985).
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malpractice, maximum liability could be set at some appropriate level,
perhaps $1,000,000.
Finally, associations and organizations that sponsor, employ or are
composed of a partnership of arbitrators should be held jointly and sever-
ally liable whenever it is determined that the associated arbitrator is lia-
ble. In addition, administrative acts that are negligently or maliciously
performed should serve as an additional basis for liability without regard
to the actions of an arbitrator in a particular case.
B. Proposed Revision to the California Code of Civil Procedure
Based on the foregoing discussion, the following is proposed as a
replacement for the current arbitral immunity statute in California:20 3
Qualified immunity of arbitrators and arbitration organizations
from civil liability
(a) In the absence of an affirmative showing of malice or subjec-
tive bad faith, an arbitrator has immunity from suit for any action that
is
(1) properly characterized as quasi-judicial, and
(2) performed within the context of an arbitration
proceeding.
(b) For the purpose of subsection (a), the existence of malice or
subjective bad faith is a question of fact that may be established by
inference from evidence that the arbitrator's actions were performed
without any objectively reasonable grounds for belief in the propriety
of the conduct in light of all circumstances existing at the time of the
conduct.
(c) In an action against an arbitrator, the arbitrator may be com-
pelled to answer depositions or provide other forms of testimony only
when some objective basis exists for a reasonable belief that miscon-
duct has occurred.
(d) Arbitration organizations that sponsor or employ an arbitra-
tor are jointly and severally liable for damages assessed against the
arbitrator.
(e) The proponent of a claim that seeks to hold an arbitrator lia-
ble for the arbitrator's actions certifies that to the best of the propo-
nent's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry, the claim is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law, and that it is not made for any improper purpose.
If a claim is filed in violation of this subsection, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the proponent an appro-
priate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the opposing
party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
claim, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(f) Administrative acts of an arbitration organization that cannot
be properly characterized as quasi-judicial do not enjoy immunity from
203. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (Deering Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 44
ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
liability. This liability attaches whether or not an arbitrator is also
found liable.
(g) In no action against an arbitrator or arbitration organization
shall the amount of damages for pecuniary losses exceed one million
dollars ($1,000,000).
VII. Conclusion
In California, due to the temporary nature of the immunity statute
for arbitrators,2°4 the legislature must take action before 1996 to either
reenact or amend this statute. In an effort to guide the evolution of the
doctrine of arbitral immunity, this Note has examined absolute arbitral
immunity in light of the procedural obstacles to vacating an arbitration
award, the differences between arbitration proceedings and civil proceed-
ings, the differences between arbitrators and judges, the justifications of-
fered for absolute immunity, and the current lack of both private and
public remedies for arbitral misconduct. The result of this examination
is a proposal for a qualified immunity for arbitrators and their associa-
tions as a replacement for absolute arbitral immunity.
204. Id
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